I have a confession to make: I’ve never used Strava.
I was irrevocably put off the idea in its infancy, after a post-race group recovery ride was ruined by two or three riders – who didn’t take part in the race, I’ll add – deciding to sprint up every hill home, for what I perceived at the time to be no reason at all (and still do, in fact). But I digress...
> Why all cyclists should take a break from Strava and ride unplugged
Anyway, perhaps members of the military need to follow my example, and that of Steve Thomas, by giving up on the app, as it has once again made the headlines – for potentially revealing secret locations to Russia.
The Sun reports that SAS and SBS members “have risked leaking the locations of secret military bases to Putin” by sharing their cycling and running routes on Strava.
A number of routes have allegedly been recorded around the perimeters of highly classified training sites in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Middle East and bases in Hereford and Poole.
According to the paper, intelligence has warned that Russian GRU spies are attempting to target the Special Forces by infiltrating their phone data, including their locations, movements and private images, through Strava.
While the Ministry of Defence has refused to comment, a defence source told the Sun: “This information is viewable to anyone. Quite frankly, it’s horrifying. If someone wanted to do something sinister with this information, then it would be very easy to do.”
> Strava accused of giving away military secrets through its Global Heatmaps
This isn’t the first time that Strava’s privacy settings have come under the spotlight, especially when it comes to potentially giving away military secrets.
In 2018, the Guardian reported that the popularity of the app among military personnel – who through their training are fitter than the average person with many also taking part in sport in their free time – had raised security concerns following the revelation that details of military bases, including what some believed to be secret sites, were being made public through Strava’s Global Heatmaps feature.
> Strava used to spy on Israeli military – by setting up fake segments in army bases and intelligence agencies
In June, we reported on the blog that an anonymous Strava user, who according to their profile hails from Boston, Massachusetts, had set up a number of fake segments across various military establishments in Israel, including those belonging to the country’s intelligence agencies and highly secure bases assumed to be linked with Israel’s nuclear programme.
The user – whose affiliation has yet to be uncovered – could then keep tabs on members of the Israeli military, tracking their movements as they exercised in secret bases in Israel and around the world.
The fake segment approach allowed the spies to bypass Strava’s privacy settings: while profiles can be made available only to followers, unless users set each individual activity to be actively secured, their profile picture, first name and initial will appear on segments they have covered.
> Strava’s new Edit Map Visibility provides greater privacy control
In a statement at the time, Strava said: “We take matters of privacy very seriously and have been made aware by an Israeli group, FakeReporter, of a segment issue regarding a specific user account and have taken the necessary steps to remedy this situation.
“We provide readily accessible information regarding how information is shared on Strava, and give every athlete the ability to make their own privacy selections. For more information on all of our privacy controls, please visit our privacy centre as we recommend that all athletes take the time to ensure their selections in Strava represent their intended experience.”